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Tom Shakespeare’s book Disability rights and
wrongs is very rich and interesting and ought to
be compulsory reading for anyone interested in the
relation between disability and medical ethics.1
In my short contribution to this symposium on
the book, I will focus on a particular aspect of his
discussion of prenatal diagnosis and termination of
pregnancy.
In chapter 6 of Disability rights and wrongs, a
chapter entitled Questioning prenatal diagnosis,
the author discusses a wide range of issues
concerning the relation between disability and
prenatal diagnosis. One of the arguments he
discusses is the so-called ‘‘expressivist objection’’
to prenatal diagnosis—that is, the claim that
prenatal diagnosis expresses a discriminatory or
negative attitude towards people with disability.
After having analysed the expressivist objection,
Shakespeare, in line with a range of other authors,
concludes that the argument is not sound:
Nor should we interpret a decision to have a
test or a termination as expressing disrespect or
discrimination towards disabled people.(p102)1
Is it thus time now to lay the expressivist
objection to rest? In the following, I will suggest
that it may be too early to completely dismiss the
objection, partially because it is often misrepre-
sented by its opponents, who argue against
implausibly strong versions of the objection.
THE OBJECTION UNFOLDED
What does the expressivist objection essentially
claim? The core of the claim is, as described above,
that prenatal diagnosis and termination of pregnancy
expresses certain attitudes towards disabled people.
What is taken to express these attitudes may be the
social practice of prenatal diagnosis and termination
of pregnancy either in abstraction or as it currently
exists, or the individual choices made by prospective
parents. There are thus at least three different
possible expressivist objections, and arguments that
are valid against one of them may not hold against
the others. There is, for instance, an important
difference between holding that a given politically
backed social practice expresses something and
holding that choices made by individual agents
within the context of that practice express some-
thing. In Tom Shakespeare’s discussion of the
arguments, it is not always obvious which version
of the expressivist objection he is addressing.
Another issue that needs disentangling is whether
the practice of prenatal diagnosis is claimed to
express a discriminatory or just a negative attitude
towards (a particular) disability. This disentangling is
important because the latter claim is much more
plausible and because it engages more directly with
the issue of identity. The claim that prenatal diag-
nosis expresses a negative attitude towards disability
is more plausible because in many cases there is a
wanted pregnancy that is terminated only because a
disability is detected, and in some of these cases this
is done in a situation where there is no expectation of
any further pregnancy—that is, it is not the case that
the parents are choosing between two possible future
worlds, one containing a disabled child and another
containing a different non-disabled child. They are
choosing between a world with the disabled child
and another without it, and this must, in some cases
at least, entail that they value (the particular) dis-
ability so negatively that they think the world with-
out the disabled child is preferable simply because it
does not contain that child. That attitude might
carry over to people living with that disability, even
though it does not lead to any actual discrimination.
The ‘‘negative attitude’’ version of the expressivist
objection also engages more directly with the issue of
identity. If having a particular disability is an
essential part of my personal identity, part of what
I am, the mere fact that I know or have reasonable
reasons to believe (see below) that others evaluate
that disability negatively may affect my sense of
identity and social standing negatively. And I may
justifiably feel that way even if the negative evalua-
tion does not lead to any actual discrimination.
NO OBJECTION
But maybe the expressivist objection is unsustain-
able even if clarified in these ways. The point is
often made that choosing to terminate the
pregnancy of a disabled foetus does not necessarily
or conceptually express a negative attitude towards
disability in general, or towards any living disabled
person in particular. Shakespeare makes these
points on page 90 and 98,1 referencing Buchanan,
Brock and Daniels for the insight (p98) that
It is not incompatible to seek to prevent impaired
children coming into the world, and also to
support the rights of existing disabled people.
This is obviously right, but it is unclear whether a
proponent of the expressivist objection needs to
claim that prenatal diagnosis and termination of
pregnancy necessarily expresses something. As an
analogy, it is worth considering how we would assess
the intentions and values of a politician claiming that
‘‘it is not incompatible to seek to prevent asylum
seekers from coming into the country and also to
support the rights of existing bona fide refugees who
are already here.’’
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The expressivist objection would have the same force even if
it was just a matter of contingent fact that the present practice
of prenatal diagnosis often expresses a discriminatory attitude
towards disability. If it so happens that many politicians vote to
fund prenatal diagnosis and screening programs, many health-
care professionals advise on prenatal diagnosis and termination
of pregnancy, or many parents choose prenatal diagnosis and
termination because they disrespect disabled people, then those
cases do express disrespect or discrimination, even if it is
conceptually possible to hold the two views in the quotation
above.
Another important issue is that whereas an agent has control
over what he or she intends to express, he or she does not have
exclusive control over what an action or utterance actually
expresses. Those who witness an action will often make
inferences concerning what the action is meant to express.
These inferences may be wrong, but as long as they are
epistemically warranted, the witnesses are justified in claiming
that the action did express this or that. I may want to convey a
purely artistic message concerning the evanescence of post-
modern nationalism by publicly burning your national flag, but
you would in many circumstances be warranted in inferring a
certain negative attitude towards your country (given the
normal or normal symbolic meaning of flag burning), unless I
clearly marked my action as an artistic and non-political action.
THE EXPRESSIVIST OBJECTION, VERSION 2
What can we conclude about the expressivist objection? I think
we can conclude that it is possible to imagine a socially
embedded practice of prenatal diagnosis and termination of
pregnancy that did not, as an empirical fact about that practice,
express any negative attitudes towards the disabled and could
not justifiably be construed to express such negative attitudes.
Such a practice could, for instance, exist in a context where all
reasonable healthcare and social needs of disabled persons and
their carers were met, where economic savings generated by
avoiding the birth of disabled children played no role in
decisions about the design and implementation of prenatal
screening and diagnosis programmes, where counselling was
truly non-directional and unbiased and where the identity of all
was celebrated. This is, however, not the practice of prenatal
screening and diagnosis that we are currently engaged in. As
Shakespeare himself points out, the discourse surrounding
prenatal diagnosis and screening is full of highly problematic
language use, and we have good reasons to believe that some of
the actors involved in the process act from discriminatory
motives or at the very least from a negative evaluation of
disabled fetuses and persons. Our current practice of prenatal
diagnosis and termination of pregnancy therefore to some
degree expresses exactly those attitudes that proponents of the
expressivist objection claim that it does. That the practice does
not have to express those attitudes by logical necessity is largely
irrelevant to whether it actually expresses them.
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